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DO WE NEED KYC/AML: THE BANK SECRECY
ACT AND VIRTUAL CURRENCY EXCHANGES 
Stan Sater* 
Technology is moving faster than government or law can 
keep up.  It’s moving faster than you can keep up: you should 
be asking the question of what are your rights and who owns 
your data.  
– Gus Hunt,
2013 CIA Chief Technology Officer1 
I. INTRODUCTION
The Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, com-
monly referred to as the Bank Secrecy Act (the BSA), is the U.S. 
government’s 800-pound gorilla when it comes to regulating vir-
tual currency.2  It has been expanded, transformed, and updated 
since its initial passage in 1970 to keep pace with new develop-
ments in global terrorism and money laundering, all the while 
only being challenged twice on its constitutional merits.3  The 
BSA, as notably amended by the Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), im-
poses financial recordkeeping and reporting requirements, know 
your customer (KYC) requirements, and requirements to 
* Associate, Founders Legal | Bekiares Eliezer, LLP; J.D. 2019 Tulane University
Law School. 
1. EDWARD SNOWDEN, PERMANENT RECORD 248 (2019) (quoting Ira “Gus” Hunt)
(quotation marks omitted and alteration adopted). 
2. Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1118
(1970). 
3. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 441, 443 (1976); Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz,
416 U.S. 21, 54 (1974); see PETER VAN VALKENBURGH, ELECTRONIC CASH, 
DECENTRALIZED EXCHANGE, AND THE CONSTITUTION 7 (2019), [https://perma.cc/LG8E-
NSM8]; BSA Timeline, FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, [https://perma.cc/N5NJ-
AMP7] (last visited Nov. 28, 2019).  Most recently, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to 
overrule Miller in its Carpenter decision.  Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 
(2018) (“We do not disturb the application of Smith and Miller . . . .”).   
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implement and maintain an anti-money laundering (AML) pro-
gram.4  Noncompliance can lead to both civil money penalties of 
varying amounts and criminal penalties of up to twenty-years im-
prisonment.5  
The BSA imposes these recordkeeping and reporting re-
quirements not on suspected criminals but on the financial insti-
tutions.  In this way, every financial institution, as that term is 
broadly defined in the BSA, has been deputized as a law enforce-
ment agent constantly surveilling its customers and reporting in-
formation to the government that is determined to “have a high 
degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations 
or proceedings, or in the conduct of intelligence or counterintelli-
gence activities, including analysis, to protect against interna-
tional terrorism.”6  At the center of this mass financial data gath-
ering dragnet is the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
(FinCEN).  FinCEN administers the BSA rules and implements 
regulations (BSA Regulations) through its delegated authority by 
the Department of Treasury.7  
The emergence of bitcoin and other virtual currencies raised 
an important question as to the scope of the BSA and FinCEN’s 
authority.  The question is whether the BSA and FinCEN’s au-
thority governing legacy financial institutions could be imputed 
onto a new financial system that seeks the removal of the very 
intermediaries that previously acquiesced to FinCEN’s authority.  
In 2013, FinCEN published guidance titled Application of Fin-
CEN’s Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or 
Using Virtual Currencies (2013 Guidance).8  The 2013 Guidance 
4. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 
115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered sections in numerous titles of U.S.C.). 
5. 18 U.S.C § 1956 (2018); 31 C.F.R. §§ 1010.820, .840 (2019).
6. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311, 5312(a)(2) (2012).
7. What We Do, FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, [https://perma.cc/JFV3-
RDT2] (last visited Mar. 20, 2020).  The Office of Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Federal Reserve, and the National Credit 
Union Administration also have authority to enforce the BSA against their respective regu-
lated institutions.  See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1786, 1818(i)(2) (2018); 15 U.S.C. § 78u (2012); 31 
C.F.R. § 1023.220 (2019).
8. FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FIN-2013-G001,
APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING, EXCHANGING, OR 
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interpreted the BSA Regulations and contextualized them to the 
virtual currency ecosystem while also inventing new terms such 
as “user,” “exchanger,” “administrator,” “virtual currency,” and 
“convertible virtual currency.”9  In subsequent guidance and ad-
ministrative rulings, FinCEN regularly uses these terms as well as 
defining new terms to continually apply the BSA Regulations to 
different business models that are of note in the virtual currency 
ecosystem.10 
Along with putting forth continual regulatory guidance, Fin-
CEN has issued three enforcement actions. Two of the three en-
forcement actions directly relate to virtual currency exchange ac-
tivities.  Based on the resulting civil money penalties from the 
enforcement actions as well as criminal prosecutions citing viola-
tions of the BSA since 2013, it is evident that virtual currency 
businesses and individuals are being subject to the full spectrum 
of the BSA.  While FinCEN issues new guidance and publishes 
public remarks, its goal of fostering a “culture of compliance” ra-
ther amounts to a culture of coerced compliance that necessitates 
a further inspection into whether the potential benefits from the 
financial information gleaned from the BSA requirements out-
weigh the privacy infractions of individuals and businesses.11  
The structure of this Article is in three parts.  Parts II dis-
cusses the history of FinCEN and how it became the lead enforcer 
of the BSA, the most influential financial law in the United States.  
Part III consolidates and explains FinCEN’s regulations, previous 
administrative rulings, and guidance involving the regulation of 
money transmission under the BSA as applied to virtual currency 
exchanges.  This Part further weaves in criminal prosecutions 
USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES 1 (Mar. 18, 2013), [https://perma.cc/XQ8Y-G6A4] [hereinaf-
ter 2013 GUIDANCE]. 
9. Id. at 1-3.
10. See Kenneth A. Blanco, Director, Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network, Prepared Remarks
Delivered at the 2018 Chicago-Kent Block (Legal) Tech Conference (Aug. 09, 2018), 
[https://perma.cc/2FWS-ZS67]. 
11. Id. In the six months following FinCEN’s May 2019 Guidance, FinCEN received
over 10,000 Suspicious Activity Reports (“SARs”) related to convertible virtual currency. 
More than 1,900 unique filers, most of whom never filed SARs prior to May 2019, directly 
referenced certain key terms found in the 2019 Guidance.  Kenneth A. Blanco, Director, Fin. 
Crimes Enf’t Network, Prepared Remarks Delivered at Chainalysis Blockchain Symposium 
(Nov. 15, 2019), [https://perma.cc/V8TW-RP4D] [hereinafter New York City-Blanco Re-
marks]. 
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concerning virtual currency exchanges and how virtual currency 
exchanges have evolved based on such criminal prosecutions.  
Part IV highlights how the industry has proactively responded to 
public guidance, statements, and actions from FinCEN and other 
financial KYC/AML regulators.  Through the industry’s response 
to mainly FinCEN, the industry has splintered into custodial prod-
ucts and services that mirror the legacy financial system and non-
custodial products and services.  The non-custodial products and 
services being built for the future of virtual currency do not ex-
hibit the same information risks and characteristics as their custo-
dial, command and control financial institution counterparts as 
the users allows remain in control of their funds and information.  
As this burgeoning ecosystem is seeking to remove the very fi-
nancial institutions that have been bent into submission, there are 
other means for FinCEN to protect the integrity of the financial 
systems rather than foisting BSA compliance on projects building 
software protocols that facilitate value exchange in the truest of 
peer-to-peer fashions.  Therefore, this Article takes the position 
that FinCEN should articulate an express exemption for non-cus-
todial services that build software that cannot be altered to serve 
as deputized intermediaries to surveil its users on behalf of the 
government through notice and comment rulemaking as it did in 
2011 to accommodate the Internet’s impact on the BSA.12 
II. FINCEN AS THE LEAD ENFORCER OF THE BSA
As it applies to virtual currency, FinCEN is probably the
most enigmatic financial regulator to the mainstream user.  Most 
virtual currency discussions center around the Securities and Ex-
change Commission’s enforcement of the U.S. securities laws and 
its interpretation of the oft cited Howey test as applied to the issu-
ance of new virtual currencies.13  However, little attention is 
12. Formal rulemaking is required by the BSA to alter the definition “financial institu-
tion.” See 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2)(Y) (2012). 
13. In SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., the Supreme Court stated that a financial instrument is
an “investment contract”, a catch-all term listed as a “security”, if the instrument “involves 
[(1)] an investment of money[; (2)] in a common enterprise”; (3) with a reasonable expecta-
tion of profits to be (4) derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial “efforts of others.”  
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946); see also United Hous. Found., Inc., v. 
Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975); United States v. Namer, 680 F.2d 1088, 1096 (5th Cir. 
1982) (referring to an “investment contract” as a “catch-all statutory phrase”).  Any issuance 
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focused on understanding an albeit quieter, more powerful finan-
cial regulator—FinCEN—that serves two significant roles within 
the U.S. financial system: (1) “regulator of all financial institu-
tions and the [a]dministrator of the [BSA]”; and (2) the “Financial 
Intelligence Unit, or FIU, of the United States.”14  This Part out-
lines the creation of FinCEN, its mandate from Congress, and 
how it uses its two roles to oversee certain activities within the 
virtual currency ecosystem.   
A. History of FinCEN
The BSA was passed in the beginning of the first financial 
technology wave with the introduction of ATMs, credit cards and 
debit cards, the Automatic Clearinghouse (ACH) system, and the 
Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunica-
tion (SWIFT).  When Congress passed the BSA, it had two goals 
in mind: (1) “create a paper trail to inform law enforcement of 
potentially suspicious activity” and (2) “use the BSA as a weapon 
to prosecute money launderers” based upon that paper trail.15  
Other than two BSA cases related to privacy and the U.S. Consti-
tution, the BSA was of little concern until 1985 when the First 
National Bank of Boston pleaded guilty to knowingly violating 
and willfully failing to comply with the BSA by failing to report 
over $1.2 billion in cash transactions.16  With the Money Laun-
dering Control Act following in 1986 and subsequent regulatory 
changes requiring financial institutions to maintain procedures to 
monitor BSA compliance, including Suspicious Activity Reports 
(SARs) in 1992, the modern BSA compliance program was born.  
Soon thereafter, it became clear that monitoring and enforcing 
of an “investment contract” is considered to be a securities offering requiring registration 
with the SEC under Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933.  See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
RELEASE NO. 81207, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(A) OF THE 
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934: THE DAO 10-11 (July 25, 2017), 
[https://perma.cc/KAV8-ALU6]. 
14. Kenneth A. Blanco, Director, Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network, Prepared Remarks De-
livered at the Federal Identity (FedID) Forum and Exposition (Sept. 24, 2019), 
[https://perma.cc/MKN2-7BC2] [hereinafter Tampa-Blanco Remarks]. 
15. Scott Sultzer, Money Laundering: The Scope of the Problem and Attempts to Com-
bat It, 63 TENN. L. REV. 143, 153-54 (1995). 
16. Id. at 158; United States v. First Nat’l Bank of Boston, CR 85 52-MA (D. Mass.
filed Feb. 7, 1985). 
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each financial institution’s BSA compliance program necessi-
tated a single administrative agency.17 
FinCEN was created within the Department of Treasury by 
Executive Order in 1990 with the express mission “to provide 
governmentwide, multi-source intelligence and analytical net-
work in support of the detection, investigation, and prosecution 
of domestic and international money laundering and other finan-
cial crimes by Federal, State, local, and foreign law enforcement 
agencies.”18  In 1994, FinCEN’s mission was broadened to in-
clude regulatory responsibilities, and the Treasury’s Office of Fi-
nancial Enforcement (FinCEN’s predecessor) was merged with 
FinCEN.19  In 2002, following the enactment of the USA 
PATRIOT Act20, FinCEN became an official Bureau within the 
Treasury Department “to support law enforcement efforts and 
foster interagency and global cooperation against domestic and 
international financial crimes, and to provide U.S. policy makers 
with strategic analyses of domestic and worldwide trends and pat-
terns.”21  On March 8, 2004, FinCEN joined with the Department 
of the Treasury’s Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, 
which leads “fighting the financial war on terror, combating fi-
nancial crime, and enforcing economic sanctions against rogue 
nations.”22  In 2012, FinCEN launched FinCEN Query, allowing 
authorized federal, state, and local law enforcement “to easily ac-
cess, query, and analyze eleven (11) years of FinCEN data; apply 
filters and narrow search results; utilize enhanced data; and im-
port lists of data (e.g., names, identification numbers, and 
17. See Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act, Pub. L. No. 102-550, tit. XV,
sec. 1517, 106 Stat. 4044 (1992) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g) (2014)); see generally 
Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-18 (1986) (cod-
ified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 31 U.S.C.). 
18. Treas. Order 105-08 (Apr. 25, 1990), [https://perma.cc/BH7E-LFGC].
19. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, 74 Fed. Reg. 59,096, 59,096 n.5 (Nov.
17, 2009).  
20. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
56, tit. III, Subtitle B, sec. 361(a)(2), § 310(a), 115 Stat. 272, 329. 
21. Treas. Order 180-01 (Sept. 26, 2002).
22. FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, ANN. REP. FISCAL YEAR 2004 3 (Jan. 2005),
[https://perma.cc/M8C3-PLQ3]. 
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addresses).”23  FinCEN Query captures four BSA report types: 
SARs, Currency Transaction Reports (CTRs),24 the Designation 
of Exempt Person (DOEP), and Registered Money Service Busi-
ness (RMSB).25 
B. FinCEN’s Reach
The BSA is a series of statutory provisions designed to pre-
vent money-laundering and terrorist financing.  The BSA places 
an affirmative duty on all financial institutions operating in the 
United States to disclose those who conduct transactions in excess 
of $10,000 through CTRs and to file other information regarding 
suspected illegal or suspicious transactions through SARs.26  As 
previously mentioned, such oversight of the financial institutions 
subject to the BSA was delegated to FinCEN, which is 
23. Press Release, Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network, FinCEN Query Now Available for Au-
thorized Users: IT Modernization Program is on Schedule and Within Cost (Sept. 10, 2012), 
[https://perma.cc/B72W-ZR5Q]. 
24. A CTR is a report on a “deposit, withdrawal, exchange of currency[,] or other pay-
ment or transfer” through a financial institution that involves more than $10,000 in currency.  
Filing Obligations for Reports of Transactions in Currency, 31 C.F.R. § 1010.311 (2011).  A 
“domestic financial institution” is required to file CTRs with the Treasury Department when 
it “is involved in a transaction for the payment, receipt, or transfer of United States coins or 
currency” exceeding $10,000.  31 U.S.C. § 5313(a) (1994); 31 C.F.R. § 1010.311. 
25. Bank Secrecy Act, FinCEN Query (FCQ), IRM 4.26.4 (Jan. 6, 2016),
[https://perma.cc/KWG9-7YLT]. 
26. An MSB must report transactions that the MSB “knows, suspects, or has reason to
suspect” are suspicious, if the transaction is conducted or attempted by, at, or through the 
MSB, and the transaction involves or aggregates to at least $2,000.00 in funds or other assets.  
Reports by Money Services Businesses of Suspicious Transactions, 31 C.F.R. § 
1022.320(a)(2) (2016).  A transaction is “suspicious” if the transaction: (i) “involves funds 
derived from illegal activity”; (ii) “is intended or conducted in order to hide or disguise funds 
or assets derived from illegal activity,” or to disguise “the ownership, nature, source, loca-
tion, or control of such funds or assets” derived from illegal activity; (iii) “[i]s designed, 
whether through structuring or other means, to evade any requirements” in the Bank Secrecy 
Act or its implementing regulations; (iv) “[s]erves no business or apparent lawful purpose, 
and the [MSB] knows of no reasonable explanation for the transaction after examining the 
available facts, including the background and possible purpose of the transaction;” or (v) 
“[i]nvolves use of the [MSB] to facilitate criminal activity.”  31 C.F.R. § 1022.320(a)(2). 
Since the enactment of the BSA in 1970, the monetary thresholds have never been adjusted 
for inflation.  A $10,000 transaction in 1970 is approximately a $68,000 transaction in 2020 
when taking inflation into account.  In effect, the scope of transactions that trigger the BSA 
has continually expanded over the last fifty years simply through inflation.  Of note, the civil 
money penalties for violating the BSA were adjusted upward to account for inflation in 2015.  
J.P. Koning, Why Aren’t Anti-Money-Laundering Regulations Adjusted for Inflation?, 
AIER.ORG (Jan. 23, 2020), [https://perma.cc/L58X-QQZF]. 
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responsible for shaping how financial institutions comply with the 
BSA Regulations.  Using the BSA Regulations, FinCEN has dep-
utized financial institutions as law enforcement agents to help 
carry out its mission to “safeguard the financial system from illicit 
use and combat money laundering and promote national security 
through the collection, analysis, and dissemination of financial 
intelligence and strategic use of financial authorities.”27  FinCEN 
does this by issuing regulations, interpretive guidance, commu-
nity outreach and training, collecting and analyzing reports, and 
engaging in civil enforcement actions.  Regardless of the financial 
activity, all BSA obligations that apply to a particular financial 
institution ultimately flow from FinCEN’s regulations.28  
Failure to comply with the BSA Regulations can result in the 
imposition of civil money penalties and criminal penalties.  As a 
regulatory agency lacking independent litigating authority, Fin-
CEN is only authorized to impose civil money penalties.29  Civil 
money penalties can range from $500 for each negligent violation 
to $50,000 for patterns of negligent violations.30  Willful viola-
tions can amount to $25,000 or the amount of the transaction, 
whichever is greater.31  Failure to establish an adequate AML pro-
gram can result in a $25,000 penalty per day.32  Civil money pen-
alties may be imposed regardless of any imposition of criminal 
penalties.33  
FinCEN’s authority to levy civil money penalties is very 
broad and, unlike other regulators, FinCEN has not publicly pub-
lished a list of factors or procedures that it uses before imposing 
27. What We Do, FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, [https://perma.cc/V684-
YKLT] (last visited Jan. 5, 2020). 
28. FinCEN regulations for brokers or dealers in securities are covered under 31 C.F.R.
§ 1023.  See generally Rules for Brokers or Dealers in Securities, 31 C.F.R. § 1023 (2011).
Futures commission merchants are covered under 31 C.F.R. § 1026.  See generally Rules for
Futures Commission Merchants and Introducing Brokers in Commodities, 31 C.F.R. § 1026
(2011).  Introducing brokers in commodities are covered under 31 C.F.R. § 1026.  See gen-
erally 31 C.F.R. § 1026.  Mutual funds are covered under 31 C.F.R. § 1024.  See generally
Rules for Mutual Funds, 31 C.F.R. § 1024 (2011).
29. See 31 C.F.R. § 1010.810 (2014).
30. 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(6)(A)-(B) (2004).
31. 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(1).
32. See 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(1).
33. 31 U.S.C. § 5321(d).
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civil money penalties.34  Its broad authority appears to allow it to 
impose a civil money penalty unilaterally and without a fact-find-
ing hearing before an administrative law judge.35  Once a civil 
money penalty is imposed, the financial institution may only seek 
a lengthy and expensive review from a federal district court.36  
The enforcement proceedings seemingly therefore promote 
forced settlement under duress and a market response to submit 
extraneous reports to FinCEN.37 
As a result, FinCEN’s BSA database houses nearly 300 mil-
lion records servicing on average some 30,000 searches of this 
data each day and 7.4 million queries per year from more than 
“12,000 agents, analysts, and investigative personnel from over 
350 unique federal, state, and local agencies across the United 
States with direct access to this critical reporting by financial in-
stitutions.”38  While the majority of these reports come from fi-
nancial institutions via CTRs and SARs, FinCEN also collects in-
formation from cash crossing the U.S. border upon exit and entry, 
from retail stores receiving cash payments in excess of $10,000, 
and “from individuals with foreign bank accounts.”39  FinCEN 
further works with over 164 foreign countries sharing its financial 
intelligence information with them “when appropriate.”40  With 
access to a variety of databases, FinCEN is at the center of one of 
the largest repositories of financial information in the world in a 
position to readily provide any FIU in the world with information 
and provide foreign governments with policy recommendations, 
analytical training, advice, and staff support.41 
34. Robert B. Serino, FinCEN’s Lack of Policies and Procedures for Assessing Civil
Money Penalties in Need of Reform, BUS. L. TODAY, July 2016, at 1, 4. 
35. Id.
36. See id. at 2.
37. Id. at 2-3; see 31 U.S.C. §5318(g)(3)(A) (2014) (providing immunity to any finan-
cial institution that, in good faith, “makes a voluntary disclosure of any possible violation of 
law or regulation to a government agency”). 
38. New York City-Blanco Remarks, supra note 11.
39. Tampa-Blanco Remarks, supra note 14.
40. Id.
41. International Programs, FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, 
[https://perma.cc/ATM7-7P4S] (last visited Dec. 26, 2019). 
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III. FINCEN ENTERS VIRTUAL CURRENCY
This Part outlines FinCEN’s key definitions and interpretive 
opinions of how the BSA Regulations apply to various virtual cur-
rency business models.  This Part also incorporates criminal pros-
ecutions that relied in part on FinCEN’s interpretations of the 
BSA and places these decisions in a chronological order in paral-
lel with FinCEN’s public guidance to display how the understand-
ing of the BSA as applied to virtual currency has evolved since 
2013. 
A. Definitions
In 2011, FinCEN adopted a set of final rules (the 2011 Final 
Rules) amending the definition of “money services business” rec-
ognizing that the Internet and other technological advancements 
were changing how businesses were offering money services 
business (MSB) services.42  One such MSB service is a money 
transmitter.43  A “money transmitter” is “[a] person that provides 
money transmission services” or “[a]ny other person engaged in 
the transfer of funds” whereby “‘money transmission services’ 
means the acceptance of currency, funds, or other value that sub-
stitutes for currency from one person and the transmission of cur-
rency, funds, or other value that substitutes for currency to an-
other location or person by any means.”44  In sum, FinCEN’s rules 
apply to all transactions involving money transmission including 
fiat to fiat transactions, fiat to value that substitutes for currency 
transactions, and value that substitutes for currency to value that 
substitutes for currency transactions. 
This expansive view of what it means to be a money trans-
mitter made it relatively easy for FinCEN in 2013 to affirmatively 
bring virtual currency within its regulatory jurisdiction via inter-
pretive guidance.  FinCEN began the 2013 Guidance by clearly 
defining “real” currency and “virtual” currency.45 FinCEN de-
fined real currency as (1) a jurisdiction’s coin and paper money 
42. Definitions and Other Regulations Relating to Money Services Businesses, 76 Fed.
Reg. 43585 (July 21, 2011). 
43. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff) (2014).
44. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(i)(A).
45. 2013 GUIDANCE, supra note 8, at 1.
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that is (2) “designated as legal tender” for that jurisdiction and (3) 
“is customarily used and accepted as a medium of exchange in 
the” jurisdiction.46  Virtual currency is defined as “a medium of 
exchange that operates like a currency in some environments, but 
does not have all the attributes of real currency.”47  Convertible 
virtual currency (CVC) is a virtual currency that “has an equiva-
lent value in real currency, or acts as a substitute for real cur-
rency.”48  Virtual currencies and CVCs are not legal tender in any 
jurisdiction; however, both are value that substitutes for currency. 
  Within the CVC ecosystem, there are three participants: (1) 
users, (2) administrators, and (3) exchangers.  “A user is a person 
that obtains virtual currency to purchase goods or services.”49  Us-
ers who use virtual currency to purchase goods or services on their 
own behalf are not money transmitters.50  “An administrator is a 
person engaged as a business in issuing (putting into circulation) 
a virtual currency, and who has the authority to redeem (to with-
draw from circulation) such virtual currency.”51  “An exchanger 
is a person engaged as a business in the exchange of virtual cur-
rency for real currency, funds, or other virtual currency.”52  Unless 
an exemption exists, FinCEN classifies both an administrator and 
an exchanger as money transmitters if it accepts and transmits 
CVC in exchange for real currency or another CVC for any rea-
son.53  Therefore, administrators and exchangers, as money trans-
mitters, must (1) register with FinCEN as an MSB54; (2) develop, 
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 2 (emphasis omitted).
50. 2013 GUIDANCE, supra note 8, at 2.
51. Id. (emphasis omitted).
52. Id. (emphasis omitted).
53. Id. at 3. The BSA Regulations identify six circumstances that fall outside the scope
of the definition of “money transmitter.”  31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(ii) (2019).  The most 
notable of the six include: a person who merely “[p]rovides the delivery, communication, or 
network” instruments for transmission; a payment processor who facilitates payment for 
goods or services “by agreement with the creditor or seller”; and accepting or transmitting 
funds “integral to the sale of goods or . . . services . . . by the person . . . accepting and trans-
mitting the funds.”  31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(ii)(A)-(B), (F). 
54. 31 U.S.C. § 5330(a)(1) (2012); 31 C.F.R. § 1022.380(a)(1), (b)(1)(i), (b)(2) (2019).
MSB registration with FinCEN must be renewed every two years.  31 C.F.R. § 
1022.380(b)(2).   
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implement, and maintain an AML program55; (3) establish record-
keeping and reporting measures, including filing SARs and 
CTRs; and (4) comply with the Funds Transfer Rule and the 
Funds Travel Rule.56 
B. Application of BSA Regulations to Virtual Currency
Exchanges 
Since before Bitcoin, the government has pursued a number 
of criminal cases asserting BSA violations by virtual currency 
businesses.  In 2007, e-Gold, its founders, and its directors were 
charged with money laundering and operating an unlicensed 
money transmitting business.57  e-Gold was an alternative pay-
ment system with a virtual currency backed by physical gold.58  
Arguing that e-Gold was not a “money transmitting business” 
55. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h) (2012).  The AML program must: (i) “[i]ncorporate [written]
policies, procedures, and internal controls reasonably designed to assure [ongoing] compli-
ance”; (ii) designate an individual compliance officer responsible for assuring “day to day 
compliance with the program and” Bank Secrecy Act requirements; (iii) provide training for 
appropriate personnel, which specifically includes “training in the detection of suspicious 
transactions”; and (iv) “[p]rovide for independent review to monitor and maintain an ade-
quate program.”  31 C.F.R. § 1022.210(d) (2019); accord 31 U.S.C. § 5318(a)(2), (h). 
56. 31 C.F.R. §§ 1010.311, 1010.410(e)-(f), 1022.320(a)(1) (2019).  Subsection (e) is
the Funds Transfer Rule and only applies to nonbank entities. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.410(e); FIN. 
CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, FIN-2014-R011, REQUEST FOR 
ADMINISTRATIVE RULING ON THE APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO A 
VIRTUAL CURRENCY TRADING PLATFORM 7 (2014), [https://perma.cc/9B7A-H96T] [here-
inafter OCTOBER 2014 ADMINISTRATIVE RULING].  Although this subsection expressly ex-
cludes banks from its requirements (31 C.F.R. § 1020.410(a) is the Funds Transfer Rule 
applying to banks), it uses broad language that is nonspecific to banks.  31 C.F.R. § 
1010.410(e); see STEVEN MARK LEVY, FEDERAL MONEY LAUNDERING REGULATION: 
BANKING, CORPORATE, & SECURITIES COMPLIANCE 3-36 (Supp. 2012).  Additionally, sub-
section (f), the Funds Travel Rule, applies to any institution acting as an intermediary in the 
transmitting of funds. See 31 C.F.R 1010.410(f); OCTOBER 2014 ADMINISTRATIVE RULING, 
supra, at 7.  This subsection also uses broad language non-specific to banks, which allows it 
to encompass any financial institution. See 31 C.F.R. 1010.410(f); Funds Transfers Record-
keeping—Overview, Funds Transfer Recordkeeping, Regulatory Requirements, BSA/AML 
Manual, FFIEC BSA/AML INFOBASE, [https://perma.cc/BE7V-V7SB] (last visited Mar. 29, 
2020).  A financial institution must pass on all the information it receives from a previous 
financial institution when it is processing a transmittal of funds of $3,000 or more.  31 C.F.R. 
1010.410(f)(2).  For virtual currency businesses, the Funds Travel Rule “is the most com-
monly cited violation” of the BSA.  Gertrude Chavez-Dreyfuss, U.S. to Strictly Enforce Anti-
Money Laundering Rules in Cryptocurrencies – FinCEN Chief, CNBC (Nov. 15, 2019), 
[https://perma.cc/HE66-NK7K]. 
57. Indictment at 6, 9, 18, United States v. e-Gold, Ltd., 550 F. Supp. 2d 82 (D.D.C.
2008) (No. 07-109), 2007 WL 2988241. 
58. Id. at 6.
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because it did not process cash transactions, e-Gold never regis-
tered as a “money transmitting business” nor did it file CTRs.59  
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia rejected all 
of e-Gold’s arguments, ruling that e-Gold was engaged in “money 
transmitting” by “transferring funds on behalf of the public,” 
which required it to comply with Section 5330’s registration re-
quirements and file CTRs.60  Thus, the e-Gold decision combined 
with the 2011 Rule was enough for FinCEN to bridge the gap be-
tween the new era of virtual currencies and the BSA. 
In the post-2013 Guidance era, the criminal prosecution of 
Charlie Shrem, the former CEO of BitInstant, the most popular 
virtual currency exchange in the United States at the time, set the 
scene for the government’s willingness to rely on its imprison-
ment trump card provided by the BSA.61  On August 19, 2014, 
relying in part on FinCEN’s 2013 Guidance, the Southern District 
of New York denied Charlie Shrem’s, motion to dismiss the in-
dictment of violating Section 196062; Shrem later pleaded guilty 
for selling approximately $1 million to an unlicensed money 
transmitting business that operated on the Silk Road and was sen-
tenced to two years in prison.63  The arrest and ultimate sentencing 
of Shrem sent a shock throughout the Bitcoin world, putting on 
full display the government’s willingness to prosecute rather than 
settle with those engaged in allegedly illicit transactions 
59. United States v. e-Gold, Ltd., 550 F. Supp. 2d 82, 87-88 (D.D.C. 2008).
60. Id. at 88, 93, 97.
61. See Carla L. Reyes, Moving Beyond Bitcoin to an Endogenous Theory of Decen-
tralized Ledger Technology Regulation: An Initial Proposal, 61 VILL. L. REV. 191, 206 & 
n. 93 (2016).  Shortly following the Shrem case, federal prosecutors charged the founder of
Liberty Reserve with conspiracy to commit money laundering, conspiracy to commit inter-
national money laundering, and operating an unlicensed money transmitting business.
United States v. Budovsky, No. 13cr368 (DLC), 2015 WL 5602853, at *1-3, *11 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 23, 2015).  Relying in part on United States v. Faiella, the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York held that virtual currencies are “funds” under Section 1960
because they can “be easily purchased in exchange for ordinary currency, act as a denomi-
nator of value, and [are] used to conduct financial transactions.”  See id. at *14 (quoting
United States v. Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d 544, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)) (quotation marks omit-
ted).  Thus, Liberty Reserve was operating as an unlicensed, foreign-based money transmitter
in violation of Section 1960.  See id.; Founder of Liberty Reserve Pleads Guilty to Launder-
ing More Than $250 Million Through His Digital Currency Business, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE
(Jan. 29, 2016), [https://perma.cc/RC46-9U47] [hereinafter Liberty Reserve].
62. United States v. Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d 544, 546-47 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
63. See Tanya Macheel, Charlie Shrem Saga Ends with Two-Year Sentence in New
York Court, COINDESK (Jan. 21, 2015), [https://perma.cc/NA6S-YZAX]. 
410 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  73:2 
denominated in virtual currency.64  Following the 2013 Guidance 
and the prosecution of Charlie Shrem, it was generally understood 
that custodial virtual currency exchanges operating within the 
United States were required to register with FinCEN as money 
transmitters.  
As criminal prosecutions were occurring in parallel, FinCEN 
continued to clarify the BSA’s application on subsequent business 
models through a series of administrative rulings, two of which 
were issued in January 2014.65  In its second administrative ruling 
in January 2014, FinCEN expressly stated that “[t]he production 
and distribution of software, in and of itself, does not constitute 
acceptance and transmission of value, even if the purpose of the 
software is to facilitate the sale of virtual currency.”66  Therefore, 
the development of software alone, despite the purpose, does not 
amount to the developer being a money transmitter. 
In FinCEN’s October 2014 Administrative Ruling on the 
Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to a Virtual Currency Trad-
ing Platform, it ruled that:  
[a]n exchanger will be subject to . . . FinCEN regulations re-
gardless of whether the exchanger [is] . . . attempting to
match two (mostly) simultaneous and offsetting transactions
involving the acceptance of one type of currency and the
transmission of another[] or . . . transacting from its own re-
serve in either convertible virtual currency or real currency
. . .67
64. Kashmir Hill, Winklevosses, Bitcoin Community Shocked by Arrest of BitInstant
CEO Charlie Shrem, FORBES (Jan. 27, 2014), [https://perma.cc/YY5Y-7KPP]. 
65. GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, U.S. Developments in Virtual Currencies: Fin-
CEN Administrative Rulings and New York Department of Financial Services Hearings (Feb. 
12, 2014), [https://perma.cc/J3PP-7WB2]. Other than the actions discussed in this section, 
federal prosecutors have brought criminal prosecutions against online marketplaces for illicit 
goods such as Silk Road and AlphaBay that used virtual currency as a payment method. 
United States v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540, 549-50 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Indictment at 21, 
United States. v. Cazes, No. 1:17-CR-00144 (E.D. Cal. June 1, 2017), dismissed, No. 1:17-
CR-00144-LJO-SKO (E.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2018); see United States v. 2013 Lamborghini 
Aventador LP700-4, No. 1:17-cv-00967-ljo-sko, 2018 WL 3752131, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 
8, 2018). 
66. FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FIN-2014-R002,
APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO VIRTUAL CURRENCY SOFTWARE 
DEVELOPMENT AND CERTAIN INVESTMENT ACTIVITY 2 (2014), [https://perma.cc/ZCF4-
788A] [hereinafter JANUARY 2014 RULING]. 
67. OCTOBER 2014 ADMINISTRATIVE RULING, supra note 55, at 6.
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Neither the method of funding the transaction nor the fact that the 
parties transacting are never identified has any bearing on the 
analysis.  The fact that the company sits in the middle of the ex-
change between parties conducting each trade and the inapplica-
bility of the integral exemption qualifies the exchange as a money 
transmitter.68  
Almost two years after the last FinCEN administrative rul-
ing, the Southern District of New York, which had previously pre-
sided over the Shrem case, denied Anthony Murgio’s motion to 
dismiss two counts charging him with “operating, and conspiring 
to operate” his business, Coin.mx, “as an unlicensed money trans-
mitting business.”69  Murgio was subsequently sentenced to five 
years in prison for processing “more than $10 million in illegal 
Bitcoin transactions” through his cryptocurrency exchange 
Coin.mx between 2013 and 2015.70 
One year later, FinCEN issued its second supervisory en-
forcement action against BTC-e, a foreign-located money ser-
vices business acting as an exchanger of convertible virtual cur-
rencies.71  FinCEN determined that BTC-e, a virtual currency 
exchange, and Alexander Vinnik, one of BTC-e’s operators, will-
fully violated U.S. AML laws and assessed a $110 million civil 
68. Id. at 3.  In order for the integral exemption to apply, three conditions must exist:
(1) “[t]he money transmission component must be part of the provision of goods or services
distinct from money transmission itself”; (2) “[t]he exemption can only be claimed by the
person that is engaged in the provision of goods or services distinct from money transmis-
sion”; and (3) “[t]he money transmission component must be integral (that is, necessary) for
the provision of the goods or services.”  Id. at 4.
69. United States v. Murgio, 209 F. Supp. 3d 698, 704-05, 715 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
70. Operator of Unlawful Bitcoin Exchange Sentenced to More Than 5 Years in Prison
for Leading Multimillion-Dollar Money Laundering and Fraud Scheme, DEP’T OF JUST. 
(June 27, 2017), [https://perma.cc/G9Q8-D2CN].  
71. See BTC-e, No. 2017-03, at *2 (U.S. Dep’t of Treasury July 26, 2017),
[https://perma.cc/2ZYN-Z9WU] [hereinafter BTC-e Action].  The first digital asset related 
supervisory enforcement action was issued in May 2015 against Ripple Labs.  Ripple Labs 
agreed to pay a $700,000 civil money penalty for willfully violating the BSA requirements 
by operating as an MSB and selling its digital asset, XRP, without registering and “failing to 
implement and maintain an adequate [AML] program,” and failing to file SARs for several 
transactions.  Ripple also entered into a settlement agreement to defer criminal prosecution. 
FinCEN Fines Ripple Labs Inc. in First Civil Enforcement Action Against a Virtual Currency 
Exchanger, FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK (May 5, 2015), [https://perma.cc/SKG9-E8YD]. 
FinCEN assessed this penalty in coordination with the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the North-
ern District of California. See Settlement Agreement: Attachment B, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 
1 (May 5, 2015), [https://perma.cc/5U6U-FGGL]. 
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money penalty on BTC-e.72  From November 5, 2011 to the date 
of the action, BTC-e and Vinnik failed to verify basic customer 
information, failed to maintain an AML compliance program, al-
lowed over $40 million in transfers from bitcoin mixers,73 “pro-
cessed transactions involving funds stolen from the Mt. Gox ex-
change,” “processed thousands of suspicious transactions without 
ever filing a single SAR,” failed to maintain records from trans-
mittals in excess of $3,000, and “lacked basic [internal] controls” 
to prevent users using the exchange for illicit purposes.74  Yet, 
BTC-e never filed any reports with FinCEN.75  Thus, BTC-e and 
Vinnik were found to have clearly willfully violated their report-
ing requirements and obligations as exchangers and administra-
tors of digital assets.  
As FinCEN has shown on previous occasions, foreign oper-
ating financial institutions are well within its authority as prom-
ulgated under the BSA and the USA PATRIOT Act.76  Jamal El-
Hindi, Acting Director for FinCEN at the time noted,  
We will hold accountable foreign-located money transmit-
ters, including virtual currency exchangers, that do business 
in the United States when they willfully violate U.S. anti-
money laundering laws . . .  Treasury’s FinCEN team and 
our law enforcement partners will work with foreign coun-
terparts across the globe to appropriately oversee virtual 
72. BTC-e Action, supra note 69, at *3, *9.  In order to show willfulness, “[t]he gov-
ernment need not show that the entity or individual had knowledge that the conduct violated 
the Bank Secrecy Act, or that the entity or individual otherwise acted with an improper mo-
tive or bad purpose.”  Id. at 3 n.10; see 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(1) (2012). 
73. “Mixers anonymize bitcoin addresses and obscure bitcoin transactions by weaving
together inflows and outflows from many different users.  Instead of directly transmitting 
bitcoin between two bitcoin addresses, the mixer disassociates connections.  Mixers create 
layers of temporary bitcoin addresses operated by the mixer itself to further complicate any 
attempt to analyze the flow of bitcoin.”  BTC-e Action, supra note 69, at *5-6.  
74. Id. at *3-7, *9.  In 2014, Mt. Gox was hacked, losing approximately 850,000
bitcoins “worth $473 million at the time and reflecting 7% of the total supply of bitcoin.”  
Nathaniel Whittemore & Clay Collins, A History of Crypto Exchanges: A Look at Our In-
dustry’s Most Powerful Institutions, NOMICS (Nov. 14, 2019), [https://perma.cc/336P-
VUKY].  At the time of the hack, Mt. Gox was responsible for approximately 70%-80% of 
all bitcoin transactions.  Id.   
75. See BTC-e Action, supra note 69, at *5, *7.
76. See generally United States v. Budovsky, No. 13cr368 (DLC), 2015 WL 5602853,
at *7 & n.5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2015); Liberty Reserve, supra note 60. 
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currency exchangers and administrators who attempt to sub-
vert U.S. law and avoid complying with U.S. AML safe-
guards.77 
Almost two years after the BTC-e action, on April 18, 2019, 
FinCEN issued its third digital assets related supervisory enforce-
ment action against Eric Powers, an individual operator of a P2P 
convertible virtual currency exchange.78  Powers advertised his 
services to buy and sell bitcoin from others on web forums and 
various websites with some transactions taking place in person, 
through mail, through wire, or directly on an exchange on behalf 
of others.79  During the time period, Powers never registered as an 
MSB, filed a CTR or SAR, or implemented an AML program or 
internal controls as per the BSA and its implementing regula-
tions.80  The action reiterated the requirement that MSBs must re-
port suspicious transactions that “involve or aggregate to at least 
$2,000 in funds or other assets.”81  
Unlike the prior enforcement actions, the Powers action mer-
its a deeper analysis for four reasons.  First, Powers was an indi-
vidual selling on his own account and transacting directly with his 
counterparties.82  A first pass reading of the action implies that 
mere two-party exchange is money transmission, which goes 
against the common interpretation that “money transmission” re-
quires three parties.  Further, it contradicts FinCEN’s January 
2014 Administrative Ruling on the Application of FinCEN’s Reg-
ulations to Virtual Currency Software Development and Certain 
Investment Activity.83  The January 2014 Ruling stated that a 
company is operating as a user if it is trading CVC on its own 
account and not making transfers at the behest of third parties.84  
The Powers action fails to state the determinative factors and time 
77. FinCEN Fines BTC-e Virtual Currency Exchange $110 Million for Facilitating
Ransomware, Dark Net Drug Sales, FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK (July 27, 2017), 
[https://perma.cc/MJX6-JUY5] (quotation marks omitted). 
78. In the Matter of: Eric Powers, No. 2019-01, at *2-3 (U.S. Dep’t of Treasury Apr.
18, 2019), [https://perma.cc/Z6XG-DPG5] [hereinafter Powers Action]. 
79. Id. at *3.
80. Id. at *2, *4, *7, *8.
81. Id. at *5; see 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g)(1) (2012); 31 C.F.R. § 1022.320(a)(2) (2019).
82. See Powers Action, supra note 76, at *3.
83. Id.; JANUARY 2014 RULING, supra note 64, at 3.
84. JANUARY 2014 RULING, supra note 64, at 3.
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at which he was no longer trading on his account and began trad-
ing at the behest of others.  
Second, despite this ambiguity in interpretation, FinCEN 
conveniently introduced a new term—peer-to-peer exchanger 
(P2P Exchanger)—to gloss over the need for deeper analysis.  
P2P Exchangers are “natural persons engaged in the business of 
buying and selling CVCs[,] . . . [who] generally advertise and 
market their services through classified advertisements, specifi-
cally designed web platform websites, online forums, other social 
media, and word of mouth.”85  This definition fails to define “en-
gaged in the business of” or establish a definitive frequency-of-
exchange threshold to be considered engaged in any business ac-
tivity.86  Perhaps, a P2P exchanger could be engaged in money 
transmission simply because they accept and transmit money or 
CVC to another location, like an exchange or wallet, on a frequent 
basis and for gain or profit.87  FinCEN clearly demonstrates from 
the facts that Powers engaged in these transactions frequently, but 
fails to state whether Powers profited or gained from his services 
or explain the new P2P exchanger definition and, in a conclusory 
manner, states that Powers was a money transmitter at all relevant 
times.  While this P2P Exchanger term is not law, nor sets any 
binding legal precedent, it is now part of the key terms that Fin-
CEN has been shown to use in its enforcement actions and subse-
quent guidance reports.  
Third, the relevant period of activity was December 6, 2012 
to September 24, 2014.88  The relevant period began before Fin-
CEN issued its first guidance in 2013 but after the 2011 MSB 
Rule, thereby putting Powers on notice that his activity fell within 
FinCEN’s jurisdiction.  As well, the end of the relevant period to 
85. See FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FIN-2019-G001,
APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO CERTAIN BUSINESS MODELS INVOLVING 
CONVERTIBLE VIRTUAL CURRENCIES 14 (2019), [https://perma.cc/3FRS-SK87] [hereinafter 
2019 GUIDANCE]. 
86. The term “frequently” was last interpreted by FinCEN via public guidance in 2002
and defined in a way that is situationally dependent on the business.  DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, GUIDANCE ON INTERPRETING “FREQUENTLY” 
FOUND IN THE CRITERIA FOR EXEMPTING A “NON-LISTED BUSINESS” UNDER 31 C.F.R. 
§103.22(D)(2)(VI)(B), [https://perma.cc/XKY5-YUPD].
87. See 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(i), (8) (2019); 2019 GUIDANCE, supra note 85, at
5. 
88. Powers Action, supra note 76, at *2.
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the date of the enforcement action, April 18, 2019, is four and a 
half years.  The statute of limitations for BSA violations is five 
years for criminal violations and six years for civil penalties.89  
Arguably, FinCEN made a point to get this action filed and effi-
ciently settled before it lost its criminal prosecution leverage due 
to the statute of limitations lapsing.
Fourth, FinCEN seemingly goes out of its way to put in the 
body of the enforcement action that Powers conducted fifty-three 
transactions with customers with “@tormail.org” email ad-
dresses.90  FinCEN notes that while the use of The Onion Router 
(TOR) “in and of itself is not suspicious, transactions through a 
torrent service may be a strong indicator of potential illicit activ-
ity when no additional due diligence is conducted to determine 
customer identity and whether or not funds are not derived from 
illegal activity.”91  Rather than provide further explanation, Fin-
CEN notes that using TOR is simply suspicious on its face.  The 
broader message behind the Powers enforcement action is that in-
dividuals, depending on their activities, can be subject to the BSA 
Regulations.  
FinCEN followed its Powers enforcement action one month 
later with a new guidance report and an advisory report on illicit 
activities that involve convertible virtual currencies that should 
serve as “red flags” for MSBs, along with the “information that 
would be most valuable to law enforcement” if an MSB were to 
file a related SAR.92  The 2019 Guidance did not present any new 
expectations or requirements.93  Rather, the Guidance comprehen-
sively reiterated FinCEN’s regulations, related administrative rul-
ings, and guidance since 2011.94  The 2019 Guidance then applied 
these rules and interpretations to common business models and 
activities in the industry, clarifying its regulatory approach to this 
89. 31 U.S.C. § 5321(b)(1) (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a) (2018).
90. Powers Action, supra note 76, at *5.
91. Id. at *6 (emphasis added).
92. See FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FIN-2019-A003,
ADVISORY ON ILLICIT ACTIVITY INVOLVING CONVERTIBLE VIRTUAL CURRENCY 1 (2019), 
[https://perma.cc/6SE3-K2BR]; see also 2019 GUIDANCE, supra note 83, at 12, 15.   
93. Kenneth A. Blanco, Director, Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network, Prepared Remarks at the
12th Annual Las Vegas Anti-Money Laundering Conference (Aug. 13, 2019), 
[https://perma.cc/9CWT-7KWL]. 
94. Id.
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evolving industry and expressly reminding the industry that “a 
person that chooses to set up a transaction system that makes it 
difficult to comply with existing regulations may not invoke such 
difficulty as a justification for non-compliance or as a reason for 
preferential treatment.”95  
Expressly stated multiple times within the 2019 Guidance is 
that persons who provide “the delivery, communication, or net-
work access services used by a money transmitter to support 
money transmission services” are exempt from the definition of 
money transmitter.96  Applying to services that provide means of 
storing and transacting in virtual currencies, FinCEN articulated 
four factors to determine if the service crosses from simply tools 
to engaged in money transmission services: “(a) who owns the 
value; (b) where the value is stored; (c) whether the owner inter-
acts directly with the payment system where the CVC runs; and, 
(d) whether the person acting as intermediary has total independ-
ent control over the value.”97  Therefore, hosted, or custodial, wal-
lets are money transmitters because the user deposits value into
an account with the service provider, whereby the service pro-
vider maintains the private keys and control over the user’s virtual
currencies, rather than the user transacting directly on the under-
lying virtual currency blockchain.  Similar to other money trans-
mitters like Venmo, the user directs the service provider to trans-
fer the value on their behalf.  In contrast, unhosted, or non-
custodial, services are not money transmitters because these ser-
vices are merely downloadable software that allows the user to
store and conduct transactions without losing independent control
over their virtual currencies.98  The conclusion reached in the
2019 Guidance for this use case is logical because these service
providers are providing tools for trade and are not directly engag-
ing in money transmission services.99
Applying the delivery, communication, or network access 
services exemption to trading platforms, the focus is not only on 
the custodial issue, but also on how it provides a platform for 
95. 2019 GUIDANCE, supra note 83, at 11 n.38.
96. Id. at 24; 31 C.F.R § 1010.100(ff)(5)(ii)(A) (2019).
97. 2019 GUIDANCE, supra note 83, at 15.
98. Id. at 16.
99. Id. at 20.
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users to engage in trade.  If the platform only provides an interface 
for users to post bids and offers and trades are settled through non-
custodial wallets, then the platform is not a money transmitter.100  
However, if the platform matches the buyer and seller and pur-
chases the virtual currency from the seller to then transmit to the 
buyer directly within its platform, then the platform is a money 
transmitter.101  Thus, a virtual currency exchange that is exempt 
from FinCEN’s regulations seems to be a non-custodial platform 
which solely provides a means for buyers and sellers to find each 
other and transact directly between their non-custodial wallets 
without advertising or marketing their services and not for profit 
or gain from trading fees.102 
IV. GOING FORWARD
The previous Parts have discussed the origins of FinCEN 
and how it enforces the BSA Regulations, including against vir-
tual currency businesses.  This Part shows how virtual currency 
businesses have responded to these regulatory measures and why 
the BSA recordkeeping and reporting requirements are not neces-
sary once inside the virtual currency universe.  With an under-
standing of how the government can obtain the same information 
through chain analysis, this Part suggests that FinCEN, not Con-
gress, should adopt new rules as it did in 2011 to solidify this un-
derstanding and promote the creation of software that promotes 
financial inclusion and privacy. 
A. The Market Responds
FinCEN’s actions and those that stem from the BSA more 
generally have clear effects on the market.  Following the Fin-
CEN enforcement action against BTC-e, popular trading plat-
forms Bitfinex and BitMEX started geo-blocking U.S. persons in 
late 2017.103  On September 4, 2018, Shapeshift, a non-custodial 
virtual currency trading platform, announced that the platform 
100. Id at 24.
101. Id.
102. 2019 GUIDANCE, supra note 83, at 24; 31 C.F.R § 1010.100(ff)(8)(iii) (2019).
103. Larry Cermak, U.S. Customers to Be Blocked from Trading on Binance.com, THE
BLOCK (June 14, 2019), [https://perma.cc/5Y7Y-RXZB]. 
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would require mandatory KYC on users.104  Shapeshift had previ-
ously prided itself on allowing users to trade without accounts or 
collecting their personal information.105 In a Twitter response to 
the announcement, Shapeshift CEO Erik Voorhees stated, “KYC 
is something we’re building under duress.”106 Voorhees further 
explained,  
[W]e basically spent literally millions of dollars and a very
long time . . . navigating every nuance of international KYC
regulation.  The conclusion we came to was that there is still
a lot of grey area…The likelihood of those succeeding
seemed to be too low given the stake of the company.107
Voorhees continued, “KYC was not added as a result of any 
enforcement action, but rather as a proactive step we took to de-
risk the company amid uncertain and changing global regula-
tions.”108   
In June 2019, Binance, which is headquartered in Malta, an-
nounced that it would geo-block and suspend the trading activities 
of U.S. persons.109  At the same time, Binance announced a part-
nership with BAM Trading Services, a FinCEN registered MSB, 
to launch Binance.US, which serves as a separate corporate entity 
from Binance to service U.S. persons and licenses its technology 
and brand from Binance.110  In December 2019, Binance again 
showed the effect of being regulated by governments when it sus-
pended the ability for a user to withdraw his bitcoin to a Wasabi 
wallet due to risk management concerns and anti-money launder-
ing/counter financing terrorism (AML/CFT) controls in place.111  
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A Binance Singapore user’s account withdrawal function was fro-
zen due to risk management concerns.112 The user was attempting 
to send his bitcoin from his KYC Binance account to his Wasabi 
wallet.113  Wasabi is a software wallet that uses CoinJoin, which 
allows users to mix and anonymize their bitcoins.114  Because the 
user had a history of sending his bitcoin from Binance to a Wasabi 
wallet, Binance saw this as a “red flag” and suspended his account 
until he contacted them to answer further questions.115 This in-
stance on Binance’s platform highlights how AML/KYC proce-
dures required by financial regulators are implemented in ways 
that over censor transactions without specific and articulable facts 
to suspect criminal activity. 
This withdrawal controversy further illustrates the issue that 
KYC/AML policies, no matter the location, are effectively pre-
crimes investigations, as they are all mostly predicated or influ-
enced by the BSA.  Meanwhile, the incident brings forward im-
portant questions that have yet to be answered.  Should users have 
access to and be able to employ privacy measures upon purchas-
ing virtual currencies from regulated exchanges?  Will exchanges 
censor deposits of bitcoins that can be traced to CoinJoins?  What 
is the difference between using downstream privacy enhancing 
services and purchasing privacy virtual currencies on an exchange 
and then moving the virtual currencies off-exchange?  Is buying 
a privacy virtual currency in and of itself suspicious activity?  Is 
using privacy enhancing software and practicing good privacy hy-
giene suspicious activity?  Will exchanges develop their own 
blacklist of virtual currency addresses to censor user deposits and 
withdrawals in the name of regulatory compliance?  Without an-
swers to these questions or the government being forced to pub-
licly announce facts and circumstances that validate its reasona-
ble articulable suspicions, the government collects, analyzes, 
filters, and stores everything until it later becomes useful, all the 
while promising not to use it for a bad purpose unless you are a 
criminal. 
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B. Promoting Financial Privacy over BSA Compliance
The biggest issue in virtual currency right now is: 
the tech isn’t getting built as fast and well as it could be be-
cause everyone is engaging in “decentralization theater” to 
keep the regulators off their backs; . . . regulators are 2–3 
years behind the tech curve, are easily duped, are confused, 
and are terrified of losing cases, so they only go after the easy 
targets that don’t require rethinking the laws[; and] legisla-
tors are primarily influenced by D.C. insider lobbyists, who 
in turn are funded by corporate-style blockchain projects, 
and are proposing truly terribly drafted and ill-considered 
laws[.]116  
Specific to FinCEN, the current BSA system “is geared towards 
compliance expectations that bear little relationship to the actual 
goal of preventing or detecting financial crime, and fail to con-
sider collateral consequences for national security, global devel-
opment[,] and financial inclusion.”117  Laws are meant to promote 
the general welfare, uphold social norms, and protect individuals 
against abuses of governmental power.  In this way, certain laws 
are designed to make law enforcement’s job more difficult in 
gathering information that can later be used against individuals.  
The structure of the BSA sacrifices personal privacy to the gov-
ernment to help identify financial criminals and terrorists, yet 
there is no prohibition from this information being used for other 
forms of surveillance.  Rather than making it easier to identify 
these nefarious users, the mass amount of information reported to 
the government makes it easier for users to be lost in the crowd 
and creates more systems susceptible to data leaks, breaches, and 
attacks.118  
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Despite mainstream media reports and false narratives from 
public officials, money laundering and other violations of the 
BSA are not the predominant use cases for virtual currencies.  In 
fact, the public nature of the Bitcoin blockchain, in particular, 
makes performing signal intelligence by FinCEN much easier 
than traditional, closed financial institutions subject to the BSA 
Regulations.  Rather than forcing institutions to collect personal 
information and transaction details, leaving these systems highly 
susceptible to attack, FinCEN can simply perform blockchain 
analysis and engage in traditional police work to target financial 
criminals rather than monitoring systems that are daily infringe-
ments on people’s privacy. 
Using just one example, in 2013, the government, through 
old-fashioned police work, was able to arrest and subsequently 
prosecute Ross Ulbricht for his involvement as the leader of Silk 
Road.119  Silk Road was shut down, and Ulbricht was prosecuted 
for a multiplicity of crimes including violating Section 1960 of 
the BSA, ultimately receiving a controversial life-in-prison sen-
tence for his convictions.120  Ulbricht made a handful of uncorre-
lated mistakes in preserving his identity that led to him being 
tracked.121  The Ulbricht case shows that even for those who are 
digitally mindful, they still leave behind enough of a digital fin-
gerprint through, among other means, IP addresses, VPN server 
logs, and reusable virtual currency addresses to be found.  Since 
the Ulbricht case, there have been countless criminal prosecutions 
and civil class action lawsuits that utilize chain analysis to bring 
wrongdoers to justice.  The government has access to numerous 
other investigatory means and technological capabilities such as 
transaction clustering and heuristics that enable it to track 
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criminals that do not necessitate the collective violations of an 
entire country’s financial privacy.  
What is needed is both a cultural change from the population 
and a rule change from FinCEN.  It is understood that if a user is 
using the legacy financial institutions to purchase virtual currency 
with fiat currency, the BSA Regulations apply.122  However, once 
moving your virtual currency to other virtual currency native 
products and services, the government should not be allowed to 
use KYC information to inextricably link all future transactions 
from that address and, through statistical clustering, trace it back 
to real world persons not engaging with the fiat world without 
weighing the person’s right to privacy.  The only way to break 
this link currently is for users to regain their financial privacy and 
proactively use downloadable tools such as CoinJoin and other 
anonymity enhancing services, which FinCEN believes are 
money transmission services subject to its oversight.123  Whether 
these services register with FinCEN is another matter as is 
whether users using these services from KYC accounts could be 
forced to comply with the regulations as well.  
With approximately seven years of intricate study of virtual 
currencies, FinCEN, rather than Congress, should now take the 
time to adopt formal rules through a notice and comment process 
as it did in 2011, solidifying a new system of oversight that ap-
peases their concerns about money laundering and illicit financial 
transactions without restricting the benefits that virtual currencies 
provide to legitimate users.  Based on FinCEN’s rhetoric, it is 
clear that exerting any form of control over a user—either through 
account sign ups or control over a user’s private keys—means 
regulatory liability.  Therefore, regardless of a service’s or soft-
ware’s profit scheme, non-controlling developers and software 
providers should be expressly exempt from complying with the 
BSA Regulations as money transmitters.  These services, if truly 
decentralized, are configured in such ways that it is not a matter 
of “won’t comply” but rather a matter of “can’t comply.” 
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V. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, “[w]hat is basically at issue here is whether the 
type of partnership between government and private enterprise 
. . . can operate effectively to insure the maintenance of [ethical] 
standards in the long run.”124  The BSA, while technologically 
neutral, did not envision a technology like bitcoin that mimics 
certain qualities of cash but is based on free, open source software 
built for international, open, technical standards rather than pro-
prietary software built for national, highly guarded, closed, tech-
nical standards existing solely for highly regulated financial insti-
tutions.  Bitcoin and other virtual currencies are shoved into the 
value that substitutes for currency category, but the truly decen-
tralized projects building products and services that enable virtual 
currency transactions are not like other financial institutions.  
While custodial services like those mentioned in Section IV.A 
closely resemble the “one-to-one” intermediation model of fi-
nance that simply replace banks and other traditional financial in-
stitutions outlined in the BSA, non-custodial services are placed 
in a legal gray area.  While FinCEN is trying to figure out how to 
overlay the rule of law onto these services, the BSA system in 
place incentivizes over-reporting of financial information on un-
suspecting users and forces projects to alter their development 
paths.125  Without an updated rule making that prevents overreg-
ulation, maintains the openness principles of virtual currency, and 
expressly limits FinCEN’s ability to gather information from any 
non-custodial service built using open source software or coerce 
individuals into compliance, legitimate businesses and users will 
be prevented from benefiting from this new technology. 
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